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Maturing Patent Theory from Industrial Policy
to Intellectual Property
Oskar Liivak*
We have always known that technological progmss is important and this country has
always aimed topivmote it. A large part of thatarsponsibility has fallen on the shoulders of the
patent system. Embarassmgly despite over two hundred years of expenence, we still do not
actually know if the patent system helps or hinders technological progrss. This Essay argues
that the pmblem is not the patent system but rather patent theory Patent theory suffers from
thee linkedproblems: exceptionalness, indeterminacy and animosity First patent law is seen
as a necessarily unique exception to the oveall market economy By artificially making
patenting a profitable activity the patent system is a form of industial policy that anus to
encourage people to enter the nsky business of iventing Second we have never confidently
been able to conclude that the benefits of this ndustinal policy outweigh its costs. Thb4 and
perhaps just as important, that story inhewrntly creates animosity among important interest
groups. The resulting ongoing indeterminacy and animosity have prevented the patent system
from matunng into an accepted stable legal institution.
We can and must do better We need an institution that is stable, reliable, and accepted
7his Essay argues that we should rject the long-standing 'legal incentive"narative and begin
loolng for a better altemative. This Essay points toward an accepted stable model sitting in
plain sight: traditionalpropery We have (inconectly) thought that traditional property and its
economic system for exchange cannot provide guidance for the exotic nontival world of the
patent system. This Essay aims to show that those assumptions are wrong, and it begins
outining a patent narrative where patents ar seen as an important and natural extension of
traditional property and indeed the overall economy of tangible goods. Ther ar good reasons
to think that such a system might provide what current patent theory cannot: the basis for a
determinate andacceptedpatent system.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Patent law has arrived. Patents are front-page news. Nortel
Networks, an otherwise bankrupt company, just sold its patents to
Apple and Microsoft for over $4.5 billion.' Google just agreed to buy
Motorola Mobility for $12.5 billion largely, it is speculated, to ensure
that Google could obtain Motorola Mobility's deep patent portfolio.2
Patents are now an important issue for almost every major business.
There was a time when patents were viewed as an obscure field within
both the legal and business worlds. That is no longer the case. As a
patent attorney, this importance is welcome and overdue-we always
knew this was an important field. Though the system is enjoying the
attention, the future of the patent system remains uncertain. It is not
clear whether we are seeing patent law's triumphant arrival or whether
we are witnessing a patent "bubble" that soon will burst, laying bare an
unproductive system that benefited few besides patent attorneys.
The embarrassing fact of the matter is that we really do not know
which of these two divergent evaluations fits. Despite over two
hundred years of experience with the patent system, we are not sure
that the patent system actually helps or hinders technological progress.
This should trouble you; it certainly troubles me. After all, it is now
1. Chris V Nicholson, Apple and MicrosofR Beat Google for Nortel Patents, N.Y.
TIMES (July 1, 2011), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/07/01/apple-and-microsoft-beat-
google-for-nortel-patents/.
2. Evelyn M. Rusli & Claire Cain Miller, Google To Buy Motorola Mobility for
$12.5 Billion, N.Y TIMEs (Aug. 15, 2011), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/08/15/google-
to-buy-motorola-mobility/.
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well accepted that technological innovation is critical for economic
growth.' On a planet with limited tangible resources the only way we
can properly feed the ever-increasing numbers of mouths and minds is
to get smarter at utilizing our existing resources. The patent system
should be part of the solution, not part of the problem.
To mature into a stable, reliable, and accepted institution, the
patent system cannot get by with its current indeterminate narrative. It
needs better justification-it needs better patent theory. This Essay
does not lay out a complete patent theory capable of locking down
every doctrinal detail, rather it points us toward a fertile place to hunt
for such a theory. Often times knowing where to look for something is
the key to finding it. And as my car keys will attest, sometimes the
things we are looking for are right under our noses.
This Essay argues that the problems with the current patent
narrative can be summarized by three linked points: exceptionalness,
indeterminacy, and inherent animosity. In the current narrative, patent
law is seen as a sui generis exception to traditional property and the
overall market economy. We are taught that the nonrival world of ideas
is exotic enough that the institutions of traditional property and its
associated market economics are just not up to the challenge of dealing
with this brave new world.
Instead, the patent system is predicated on different grounds.
Stated bluntly, patent law aims to make obtaining and enforcing
patents a profitable undertaking. By doing so, patent law "promote[s]
... Progress [in the] useful Arts." In an important sense, this narrative
portrays patent law as a form of industrial policy rather than a species
of private, market property.
That exceptionalness though leads to indeterminacy. The trouble
is that neither supporters nor detractors of the modem patent system
can prove that the system is or is not socially beneficial. The narrative
3. See Peter S. Menell, Intellectual Property: General Theories, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 129, 134 (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geest eds., 2000)
("Robert Solow ... demonstrated that technological advancement and increased human
capital of the labor force accounted for most (between 80 and 90 percent) of the annual
productivity increase in the US economy between 1909 and 1949, with increases in the
capital/labor ratio accounting for the remainder.... It is now widely recognized that
technological advancement and enhanced human capital are the principal engines of
economic growth in the United States and other industrialized countries." (citation omitted));
see also E Scott Kieff, Property Ri hts and Property Rules for Connnercializing Inventions,
85 MINN. L. REv. 697, 699 n.4 (2001). See generally Peter S. Menell & Suzanne Scotchmer,
Intellectual Property Law, in 2 HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 1473 (A. Mitchell
Polinsky & Steven Shavell eds., 2007).
4. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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itself has framed the patent system as an exception to the normal
economy, and as such, it has framed the system in a way that resists
evaluation. We cannot establish the overall costs or benefits of the
system. We cannot prove it is worth it, nor can we prove it is not. The
system just endures in a persistent indeterminate state.
In addition, the current patent narrative inherently induces
animosity. The current patent narrative portrays itself as undertaking a
necessary though somewhat tragic choice. Though ideas, as opposed
to tangible goods, can in theory be shared with everyone, the patent
system has to prevent some from getting access to patented ideas in
order to provide the needed economic incentives and profits. That
tragic choice fuels controversy and mistrust.
Patent law is still, as put by Learned Hand fifty years ago,
"approach[ed] . . . with enormous passion but without enlightenment."
One side argues the system is essential for "American industry" while
the other side calls the system "a beastly method." "No one really
knows. Each side is beating the air."6 We are still in the same
stalemate. We cannot convince naysayers that the system has merit nor
can we convince overzealous advocates to concede any moderation of
the system. This embarrassing indeterminacy is becoming
increasingly impossible to ignore.
So far the response has been to focus on the middle problem, the
indeterminacy. If the cost-benefit balance of the patent system could
finally be resolved, then despite its unfortunate side effects (for
example, restricting access to ideas), we could at least steel ourselves
knowing that those costs and sacrifices were ultimately worth it. Yet
progress on that front has been very slow, and this Essay worries it
may remain so. This Essay offers an alternative. It begins not with
indeterminacy but with the earlier assumption of exceptionalness.
This Essay argues that the way forward lies in building a patent system
that extends the ideas of traditional property and the tangible market
rather than building an exception to it.
This line of argument, rethinking patent exceptionalness, has not
been investigated before because it likely appears so wrongheaded.
First, the private property system allocates scarce rival resources, yet
ideas like inventions are not rival. Unlike tangible goods, we can share
ideas without limit. On that fundamental score, private property does
5. American Patent System: Hearings Befor the Subcomm on Patents,
Trademarks, and Copyrights of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 84th Cong. 116 (1955)
[hereinafter Hand on PatentReform] (statement of Judge Learned Hand).
6. Id.
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not appear to be the proper schema for the patent system. Similarly,
the efficiency of the tangible economy depends on competition, yet
with strong competition inventors will not be able to recoup their fixed
costs. Once again, our traditional economic system for tangibles,
though familiar, appears inappropriate. And as a normative matter,
traditional property immediately brings to mind Blackstone's famous
vision of sole and despotic dominion over owned resources. If we are
to own ideas and inventions in the same sense as private property, then
many worry that such a private property based system will grossly tilt
toward inventors. Lastly, looking to staid traditional property seems
old-fashioned and backwards. Is not intellectual property the more
advanced system? What lessons could traditional property have for
shiny, modem patent law?
These objections are the main focus of this Essay. They have
unnecessarily prevented us from exploring a more stable, more
acceptable system for patents. First, as a historical matter, the patent
system is not in some way the more modem system that this Essay is
aiming to retrograde. In fact it is the exact opposite. Building a patent
narrative around traditional property is a revolutionary step forward.
At one time, both patents and property had very similar narratives that
roughly mirrored the incentive story that still dominates patent law
today. Both were government grants that aimed to entice entrepreneurs
to undertake risky activity.' In a world without any business activity,
such a coarse system makes some sense, but once enough
entrepreneurs understand the private benefits of those activities, such a
system creates animosity as it appears to be limiting rather than
stimulating enterprising business activity. Starting with the work of
the classical economists, that mercantilist vision for tangible property
was overthrown. Yet, importantly, patent law, largely because of the
differences cited above, was left behind in that revolution. That new
property narrative liberated and "democratized" tangible property, and
it led to the modem market-based economy. Compared to tangible
private property, patent law is the one that is operating with the archaic
economic thinking. The central question in this Essay is whether
patent law is finally, nearly two hundred years later, ready to join its
more advanced cousin.
The Essay addresses the objections to making this connection and
presents a vision of a patent system based explicitly on extending the
7. See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW 1836-1937 (1991).
See generaly GREGORY S. ALEXANDER, COMMODITY & PROPRIETY COMPETING VISIONS OF
PROPERTY IN AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT 1776-1970 (1997).
11672012]
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private property and the market economy to technological ideas.
Rather than presenting the patent system as some intractable sui
generis exception to private property, this Essay presents a vision for
the patent system that is compatible and integrated with our more
familiar private property institution. Such a basis for the narrative
should improve the current patent system's public relations troubles. It
will no longer be seen as some exceptional intervention upon the
traditional market. Likewise, and perhaps more surprisingly, the
system need not be viewed as inherently limiting access. Instead, the
exclusionary rights aim to channel behavior so that consumers get their
copy of the invention from the inventor rather than from a pirate. In
addition to these public relations improvements, such a narrative has
the chance of being tractable. Because it is built as an integrated
addition to the tangible economy, we can hopefully make firm claims
about the social benefits of the system. The economic machinery that
rationalizes the overall economy can be used to help quantify the
benefits of the patent system. Considering the stalemate of the
conventional narrative, surely any such promising alternative should be
thoroughly explored.
II. THE LEGAL INCENTIVE PATENT SYSTEM: ISOLATED,
INDETERMINATE, AND SUSPECT
This Part describes the current "legal incentive" narrative that
undergirds the patent system. It highlights that this narrative begins by
establishing patent law's exceptionalness. Yet that exceptionalness
(necessary as it may seem) leads not only to an intractable,
indeterminate system, but also alienates important constituents of the
patent system. The result is never ending instability and controversy.
That narrative has not yet (and likely will never) yield a stable,
accepted institution.
There are many theories that are used to justify patent law. Yet
they are all variants on one main theme: patent law is said to supply
needed incentives. The details of these theories vary from incentives
to invent, incentives to disclose inventions, incentives to
commercialize inventions, or incentives to invent new inventions that
design around existing patents.! Though differing about those details,
these theories all agree on the need for creating some type of
8. See E Scorr KIEFF ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW 66 (4th ed. 2008).
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incentive.! They agree that patent law provides "some incentive that
would be present at suboptimal levels absent the patent system."o And
they agree that the system creates those incentives through its
exclusive rights. The relevant policy debate then becomes determining
the proper size and duration for those legal incentives. Patent law aims
to provide the right amount of incentive so that, in aggregate, society
undertakes the proper amount of inventive activity." Importantly, those
narratives all start by assuming that some incentive is needed where it
is not needed elsewhere. In short, the narratives assume that patents
and the technological ideas they protect are different and exceptional.
The patent policy debates become a balancing of the inherent
tension between the harm of restricting the spread of ideas against the
benefits of the incentives. The problem with this narrative is that it
creates an indeterminate system. By styling the patent question as the
difficult balance between incentives and access, patent law has created
a system that alienates many and yet cannot ever prove that it is
socially beneficial. The root cause of the intractable nature of the
problem is patent law's exceptionalness and isolation. This Part
describes why exceptionalism and isolation appear necessary for the
patent system and then shows why that exceptionalism leads to
alienation and intractability.
A. The Legal Incendve Patent System and Its Exceptionaism
The exceptional nature of the patent system is woven into the
narrative from the very start. The narrative begins with a discussion of
public versus private goods. It highlights that inventions are different
9. Adam Mossoff, Who Cares What Thomas Jeffeson Thought About Patents?
Reevaluatng the Patent 'PRivilege" in Historical Context, 92 CORNELL L. REv 953, 962 &
n.41, 963-65 (2007) ("Although scholars today identify many operative policies in patent law,
these policies are only different applications of the same utilitarian, incentive-creating
theory.").
10. KIEFF ET AL., supm note 8, at 66.
11. In its strongest form, the incentive story devolves into a reward theory wherein
the incentive is simply monetary and the only question is how much incentive is needed for
the optimum amount of inventions. The reward theory was and continues to be pushed by
many. From that perspective, a patent is just simply a toll we all must pay in order to
compensate the inventor. See Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equip. Corp., 340
U.S. 147, 154 (1950) (Douglas, J., concurring) ("Every patent is the grant of a privilege of
exacting tolls .. . ."). For a modem take, see Jeanne C. Fromer, Claiming Intellectual
Property, 76 U. CHI. L. REv. 719, 731 (2009) ("The principal goal of the American patent
system is to stimulate innovation .... [That] occurs by rewarding inventors with a time-
limited exclusive patent right . . . ." (footnote omitted)). Again the complaint here is not that
we talk about incentives generally, but rather when we do talk about incentives we all too
often fall into the trap of thinking that the patent itself is the reward.
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from normal, tangible goods. As opposed to the scarce, rival goods of
the tangible world, ideas can be easily copied and given to others. As
famously and eloquently described by Thomas Jefferson:
[T]he moment [an idea] is divulged, it forces itself into the possession
of every one, and the receiver cannot dispossess himself of it. [Its]
peculiar character too is that no one possesses the less, because every
other possesses the whole of it. [H]e who receives an idea from me,
receives instruction himself, without lessening mine; as he who lights
his taper at mine, receives light without darkening me.12
Ideas are very different and are not scarce in the same sense that an
apple is scarce. If I eat an apple, others cannot use it for other
purposes. If I have a solution to some technical problem, I can share
that solution with everyone and everyone can utilize it without
degrading the invention at all. In other words, inventions theoretically
can improve the lives of many, many people all at once.
This raises suspicions about attempts to equate patents with
traditional property, because a fundamental role for an economic
system of private property is to allocate scarce resources to productive
ends." An economic system determines how a society should use its
scarce land, labor, and capital to meet its needs. 4 Property rights are
central to that objective.
With scarcity playing such a central role in other private property
discussions, property in ideas and information seems incongruent.
Because information and ideas can be copied so easily, there does not
appear to be the same fundamental concern about scarcity. Based on
this, many have argued that traditional property rationales have no
place in discussing intellectual property. As argued by Arnold Plant in
the 1930s and more recently as echoed by Mark Lemley: "Intellectual
property . . . is not a response to allocative distortions resulting from
scarcity, as real property law is. Rather, it is a conscious decision to
12. Thomas Jefferson, Letter to Isaac McPherson, (Monticello, Aug. 13, 1813), rn 6
THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, 11 MARCH TO 27 NOVEMBER 1813, at 379, 383 (J.
Jefferson Looney et al. eds., 2009); see also Mossoff, supra note 9, at 960.
13. WILLIAM J. BAUMOL & ALAN S. BLNDER, ECONOMICS: PRINCIPLES AND POLICY
34 (4th ed. 1988); see also Jeremy Waldron, What Is Private Property? 5 OXFORD J. LEGAL
STUD. 313, 318 (1985) ("A problem, then, which I shall call the problem of allocation, arises
in any society which regards the avoidance of serious conflict as a matter of any importance.
This is the problem of determining peacefully and reasonably predictably who is to have
access to which resources for what purposes and when. The systems of social rules which I
call property rules are ways of solving that problem.").
14. BAUMOL & BLINDER, supa note 13, at 35.
[Vol. 86:11631170
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create scarcity in a type of good in which it is ordinarily absent ... ."S
Along similar lines, Friederich Hayek "raised serious doubts about the
equation of tangible and intangible resources."" Hayek argued:
"The difference between [copyrights and patents] and other kinds of
property rights is this: while ownership of material goods guides the
use of scarce means to their most important uses, in the case of
immaterial goods such as literary productions and technological
inventions the ability to produce them is also limited, yet once they have
come into existence, they can be indefinitely multiplied and can be
made scarce only by law in order to create an inducement to produce
such ideas.""
Scarcity is a tragic fact of life in tangible goods, and traditional
property tries to make the "most" of it." With intellectual property, we
are seemingly dealing with a resource that can be shared infinitely and
yet we are, somewhat surprisingly, intentionally creating scarcity in it.
To many, private property just does not appear to be the right
framework for intellectual property.
Property rhetoric for patents also raises other more normative
concerns. Some have argued that overreliance on property analogies is
causing many of the recent problems with the intellectual property.
For these property critics, property analogies certainly cannot provide a
balanced patent system." Any discussion of traditional property too
15. Mark A. Lemley, Property Intellectual Property and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L. REV.
1031, 1055 (2005); see also Arnold Plant, The Economic Theory Concerning Patents for
Inventions, 1 ECONOMICA 30, 31 (1934) ("It is a peculiarity of property rights in patents (and
copyrights) that they do not arise out of the scarcity of the objects which become
appropriated. They are not a consequence of scarcity. They are the deliberate creation of
statute law; and, whereas in general the institution of private property makes for the
preservation of scarce goods, tending (as we might somewhat loosely say) to lead us 'to make
the most of them,' property rights in patents and copyright make possible the creation of a
scarcity of the products appropriated which could not otherwise be maintained. Whereas we
might expect that public action concerning private property would normally be directed at the
prevention of the raising of prices, in these cases the object of the legislation is to confer the
power of raising prices by enabling the creation of scarcity.").
16. Peter S. Menell, Intellectual Property and the Property Rights Movement
REGULATION, Fall 2007, at 36, 40.
17. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting I EA. HAYEK, THE FATAL CONCEIT: THE
ERRORS OF SOCLALISM 36 (W.W Bartley III ed., 1988)).
18. Plant, supra note 15, at 31.
19. As Stewart E. Sterk has argued, real property analogies have been employed
precisely for their rhetorical weight by association with traditional property. Stewart E. Sterk,
Intellectualizing Property The Tenuous Connections Between Land and Copynght, 83
WASH. U. L.Q. 417, 420 (2005) ("One might surmise then, that introduction of the property
label into copyright and patent was not accidental.... [S]upporters of expanded copyright
and patent protections invoked property terminology to seize rhetorical advantages not
otherwise available."). Likewise Mark Lemley fears that the real property analogies are used
11712012]
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quickly brings up Blackstone's oft-quoted' characterization that
property grants the owner "sole and despotic dominion" over the
object of property.2' A "neoclassicist theory" of property rights
suggests rights that are "relatively broad and clearly defined."22
Because of such absolutist visions, many have argued for abandoning
property altogether, worrying that property analogies are all too
fraught with "the trap of treating intellectual property as an absolute
right to exclude."23 Patents as property must mean "an absolute right to
exclude"24 others from the invention. As a result on this normative
front, many have resisted even calling patents part of private property.
In addition, there are more economic oriented concerns.
Competition is at the heart of the private property market and appears
incompatible with a system of encouraging technological progress.
Competition would drive the market price of an invention to near zero
(its marginal cost) and the inventor would be unable to recoup any of
the fixed costs used to create the invention. As a result, a free market
with competition appears incompatible with a patent system. Though
"[c]ompetition through free enterprise and open markets is the
as a one-way ratchet that always increases control by patent owners. Lemley, supm note 15,
at 1032 ("Protectionists rely on the economic theory of real property, with its focus on the
creation of strong rights in order to prevent congestion and overuse and to internalize
externalities. They rely on the law of real property, with its strong right of exclusion. And
they rely on the rhetoric of real property, with its condemnation of 'free riding' by those who
imitate or compete with intellectual property owners. The result is a legal regime for
intellectual property that increasingly looks like the law of real property, or more properly an
idealized construct of that law, one in which courts seek out and punish virtually any use of
an intellectual property right by another."). As a result, Lemley concludes that "treating
intellectual property as 'just like' real property is a mistake as a practical matter." Id. But
Lemley does make a distinction between real property as an institution and arguments
banning all free riding. He notes that "it might be possible to rehabilitate the property
analogy by disconnecting the concept of property from the arguments against externalities
and free riding." Id. at 1069. Even though Stewart Sterk finds the real property analogy
incorrect and harmful, he concludes, "It is far too late to expunge the rhetoric of property
from dialogue about copyright." Sterk, supra note 19, at 469. Lemley also agrees on this last
point: "[W]e may have no choice" in stopping property analogies for copyright or patent.
Lemley, supra note 15, at 1069 n. 154. I would agree and as this Essay emphasizes, a clear
analogy between traditional property and intellectual property must mean a balanced
intellectual property regime that embraces the variety and efficiency forced by competition.
20. See Albert W. Alschuler, Rediscovering Blackstone, 145 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 30 n.175
(1996); Carol M. Rose, Canons ofProperty Talk, or Blackstone Mnxiety, 108 YALE L.J. 601
(1998).
21. Lemley, supra note 15, at 1037.
22. Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copynght anda Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE L.J.
283, 310, 314 (1996) ("[N]eoclassicists ... favor .. . assigning copyright owners maximum
rights and leaving the allocation of those rights up to the market.").
23. Lemley, suprnote 15, at 1071.
24. Id.
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organizing principle for most of the U.S. economy,"25 patent law is
rationalized as "an exception to that norm."26
These presumptions drive patent law's exceptionalism. We are
told to stow away our normal intuitions about private property because
we are off to the brave new world of intellectual property. We are told
that the basic tenets of private property markets are inapplicable to
nonrival resources like ideas. The consensus view is that "[m]arkets
alone do not necessarily provide a socially optimal level of incentives
... , and so patents are seen as an important policy instrument to
remedy this market failure."' But as argued next, that exceptionalism
leads to patent law's indeterminacy.
B. Legal Incentives and Patent Indetemnnism
Simply put, once we style the patent system as an exception
meant to interfere artificially with the market economy, we have
created a system that is indeterminate. We do not know, despite two
hundred years of hand wringing, whether our patent system is helping
or hindering technological progress.28 This "patent controversy" and
its indeterminacy is nothing new.29 In fact, in what remains one of the
most authoritative examinations of the patent system to date,
economist Fritz Machlup provided the following disheartening
conclusion:
If we did not have a patent system, it would be irresponsible, on the
basis of our present knowledge of its economic consequences, to
recommend instituting [it]. But since we have had [one] for a long
25. See FED. TRADE COMM'N, To PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF
COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY 1 (2003).
26. Lemley, supra note 15, at 1031.
27. JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE 216 (2008) (citation
omitted) (citing Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for
Invention, in THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIvE ACTIvITY: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL
FACTORS 609 (1962)).
28. It appears that we continue to beat the air. See EM. Scherer, Michele Boldrme
and David K Levine.: Against Intellectual Property, 20 CONST. POL. EcON. 94 (2009) (book
review); see alsoYOCHm BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS 38 (2006) ("The efficiency of
regulating information, knowledge, and cultural production through strong copyright and
patent is not only theoretically ambiguous, it also lacks empirical basis.").
29. Fritz Machlup & Edith Penrose, The Patent Controversy m the Nneteenth




time, it would be irresponsible, on the basis of our present knowledge,
to recommend abolishing it.30
Since Machlup made those comments in 1958, a great deal of research
has been directed at the patent system, but unfortunately, the
underlying indeterminacy remains. In 1986, thirty years after Fritz
Machlup gave his famously ambiguous nonendorsement of the patent
system, George Priest returned to the same question. He stated, "The
ratio of empirical demonstration to assumption in [patent] literature
must be very close to zero."" Priest depressingly concluded,
"Personally, I believe there is little hope that economic analysis can
resolve the question of the appropriate scope of the protection of
intellectual property."32 More recently, and after more attempts had
been made toward empirical quantification, Mark Lemley similarly
admitted that "it is hard-and perhaps even impossible-to ever
calibrate intellectual property law perfectly.""
Certainly modem efforts have focused on trying to better
understand the costs and benefits of the patent system, but this Essay
argues some of these costs will remain largely unmeasurable. For
example, nearly eighty years ago, economist Arnold Plant worried
about the patent system and its basic premise that it aimed to lure
people to invent.34 In his critique of the patent system, he argued that
one thing was consistently overlooked:
The question which they one and all failed to ask themselves, however,
is what these people would otherwise be doing if the patent system
were not diverting their attention by the offer of monopolistic profits to
the task of inventing. By what system of economic calculus were they
enabled to conclude so definitely that the gain of any inventions that
they might make would not be offset by the loss of other output? By no
stretch of the imagination can the inventing class be assumed to be
otherwise unemployable. Other product which is foregone when scarce
factors are diverted in this way completely escaped their attention.
Indeed, as long as we view the patent system as a purposeful
intervention in the "normal" economy, this cost is going to be hard to
30. STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS, S. COMM. ON
THE JUDICIARY, 85TH CONG., AN ECONOMIC REVIEW OF THE PATENT SYSTEM 80 (Comm. Print
1958) [hereinafter AN EcoNoMIC REVIEW OF THE PATENT SYSTEM].
31. George L. Priest, What Economists Can Tell Lawyers About Intellectual
Property: Comment on Cheung, 8 RES. L. & ECON. 19, 19 (1986).
32. Id. at 24.
33. Lemley, supm note 15, at 1066.
34. See Plant, supmnote 15, at 30.
35. Id. at 40.
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calculate. As a result, "[T]he science of economics as it stands to-day
furnishes no basis of justification for this enormous experiment in the
encouragement of a particular activity by enabling monopolistic price
control."" In recent years, Glynn Lunney has focused on this cost in
the copyright context and argued that because the analysis fails "to
consider the opportunity cost associated with increased incentives to
create copyrighted works," the "'incentives-paradigm [is] worthless as
a guide to copyright's proper limits."' Agreeing with that assessment,
this Essay argues that the current incentive-based patent narrative will
remain indeterminate because it, among other indeterminacies, cannot
quantify its opportunity costs. In other words, by building the system
as a sui generis exception separate from the normal economic
machinery, the patent narrative dooms itself to indeterminacy.
The current approach to this indeterminacy is to just keep trying.
As Mark Lemley has stated, "Hard as it is to get the balance right, we
will never do it if we simply stop trying."" We are forced, in
Machlup's words, to just "muddle through."39 This indeterminism is so
serious that other * prominent patent scholars are abandoning the
incentive-based theory.40 In his recent book, Robert Merges reviews
the basis for the incentive-based system and because of its deficiencies
he reluctantly is forced to look elsewhere for the foundations of the
field:
Current convention has it that IP law seeks to maximize the net
social benefit of the practices it regulates... . Society offers above-
market rewards to creators of certain works that would not be created,
or not created as soon or as well, in the absence of reward. The gains
... are weighed against social losses, typically in the form of the
consumer welfare lost when embodiments of these works are sold at
prices above the marginal cost of their production. IP policy ... is a
matter weighing these things out, of striking the right balance ....
The process is [i]mpossibly complex. ... The sheer practical
difficulty of measuring or approximating all the variables involved
means that the utilitarian program will always be at best aspirational.
Like designing a perfect socialist economy, the computational
36. Id. at 5 1.
37. Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Copynghth Price Discnntination Panacea, 21 HARv. J.L. &
TECH. 387, 390 n.11 (2008) (quoting Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Reexamining Copynght
Incentives-Access Paradgm, 49 VAND. L. REv. 483, 487-89 (1996) [hereinafter Lunney,
Incentives-AccessParadgm]).
38. Lemley, supm note 15, at 1067.
39. AN EcoNoMIc REVIEW OF THE PATENT SYSTEM, supm note 30, at 80.
40. ROBERT P. MERGES, JUSTIFYING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (2011).
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complexities of this philosophical project cast grave doubt on its fitness
as a workable foundation of the field.
In my research, I have become convinced that with our current tools
we will never identify the "optimal number" of patented ... works.
Every time I . .. go looking for the utilitarian footings of the field, I
come up empty. Try as I might, I simply cannot justify our current IP
system on the basis of verifiable data showing that people are better off
with IP law than they would be without it.41
Like Merges, this Essay argues that it is time to start seriously looking
beyond the coarse incentive and access theory for a firmer foundation
for the patent system.
C Legal Incentives andPatentAnimosity
In many areas "muddling through" can work. Many problems
are hard and we just have to keep at it. But for patent law the problem
is a bit worse. The narrative, in addition to being indeterminate, is a
public relations failure. Even before reaching the cost benefit
balancing, the current patent narrative already has alienated many
important constituents, including free market proponents, advocates
for access to knowledge, and even actual inventors.
Because of its assumed exceptionalism from the market and
private property, "the chief opponents of the [patent] system have been
among the chief proponents of free enterprise."4 2 In particular, it is
precisely competitors that need to pay at the patent tollbooth.43 In
short, "[A] patent is a right to try to exclude a competitor."" As a
result, patent law is in tension with antitrust and competition law.45 As
41. Id.at2-3.
42. Machlup & Penrose, supm note 29, at 1.
43. See SUZANNE SCOTCHMER, INNOVATION AND INCENTIvES 34 (2004) (describing
the patent system as tolls).
44. DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRisis AND How THE COURTS CAN
SOLVE IT 16 (2009).
45. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Innovation and the Domai of Competition Policy, 60
ALA. L. REv 103, 108 (2008). But some have tried to reconcile patent and antitrust finding
that the two are not overtly in conflict. See FED. TRADE COMM'N, supra note 25, at 2
("Competition and patents are not inherently in conflict."); WARD S. BOwMAN, JR., PATENT
AND ANTITRUST LAw: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC APPRAISAL, at ix (1973) ("A principal
conclusion is that the antitrust/patent conflict, as courts have assessed it, is to a large extent
illusory."); see also FED. TRADE COMM'N, supra note 25, at 1 ("Both competition and patent
policy can foster innovation, but each requires a proper balance with the other to do so.
Errors or systematic biases in how one policy's rules are interpreted and applied can harm the
other policy's effectiveness."). But even though not in conflict, patent and antitrust are surely
in difficult tension.
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"an artificial deviation from competition," patent law's "basic
economic inconsistency" breeds suspicion.4 7 Hayek argued that "it is
not obvious that such forced scarcity is the most effective way to
stimulate the human creative process.'
In addition to antagonizing free marketeers, the patent narrative,
because it aims to limit access to information, has also raised very
strong normative suspicions from supporters of the free spread of
useful information. Ideally, ideas would, as put by Justice Brandeis, be
"free as the air to common use."' They can be shared without limit, so
who would ever try to prevent the spread of useful ideas? But in the
incentive narrative, we want to make inventing profitable. We
therefore think we have to limit access; if everyone was given the idea
then who would pay for it? This tension forms the central dilemma of
patent law-the incentive versus access paradox.so Ultimately, we
want ideas to be accessible to those that can use them. Yet to create
ideas in the first place, we need incentives, and to create incentives we
think we have to limit access. The tension and the inherent tragedy of
this narrative is seen in the words of Nobel Prize winning economist
Kenneth Arrow:
[I]nformation ... , say a new method of production, should, from the
welfare point of view, be available free of charge (apart from the costs
of transmitting information). This insures optimal utilization of the
information but of course provides no incentive for investment in
research.... In a free enterprise economy, inventive activity is
supported by using the invention to create property rights; precisely to
the extent that it is successful, there is an underutlization of
information.51
In fact, the push back against patents and intellectual property more
generally has been strong enough that these groups have banded
together into a broad coalition: "In the last several decades,
intellectual property law has become significantly stronger, both in the
United States and around the world. Recently, a powerful backlash has
46. Brett M. Frischmann & Mark A. Lemley, Spillovers, 107 COLuM. L. REv. 257,
267 n.33 (2007).
47. AN ECONOMIC REVIEW OF THE PATENT SYSTEM, supra note 30, at iii.
48. Menell, supra note 16, at 40 (quoting 1 HAYEK, supm note 17, at 36).
49. Int'l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 250 (1918) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
50. Lunney, Incendves-AccessParad;gm, supra note 37, at 487-89.
51. Arrow, supra note 27, at 616-17 (emphasis added).
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emerged and begun to gather loosely under the rubric of 'access to
knowledge."'52
Their focus has been protecting a public domain for ideas," and
generally they have taken a dim view of intellectual property rights.54
For patents, one of the most glaring issues has been the "access gap"
where high prices (often buoyed by patents) prevent access to
lifesaving medicines." As long as the patent narrative (and intellectual
property more generally) requires the "underutilization of
information," then there will continue to be strong suspicions if not
outright revolution against the system."
Lastly, the narrative also alienates actual inventors. The system
does this in two related ways. First, many often independently invent
the same thing and yet the patent system is designed to tax those
independent inventors if they do not win the race to the patent office.
As argued by Learned Hand, this aspect of the patent system has
fueled "a great deal of the animosity that has surrounded patents nearly
always."" And in recent years, a number of scholars have examined
and questioned this unique feature of patent law.
Yet the public relations problems with the current system vis-d-
vis inventors run even deeper. The current system, as an incentive
system, justifies exclusionary rights that extend beyond the actual
invention created by a patentee. Under the current system, patent
52. Amy Kapczynski, The Access to Knowledge Mobilzation and the New Politics
oflntellectualProperty, 117 YALE L.J. 804, 883 (2008).
53. James Boyle, The Second Enclosure Movement and the Construction of the
Public Domain, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter & Spring 2003, at 33, 37 ("[T]hings that
were formerly thought of as either common property or uncommodifiable are being covered
with new, or newly extended, property rights.").
54. See IP Reform & Innovation, YALE LAW SCH., http://www.law.yale.edulintel
lectuallife/6546.htm (last visited Apr. 16, 2012) ("[A] growing body of evidence suggests that
maximizing intellectual property monopolies [is] harmful and misguided. As these outmoded
approaches continue to dictate global legal norms and shape national legal infrastructures, the
ISP is committed towards reforming current intellectual property legal frameworks,
expanding the recognition of exceptions and limitations to IP, and the creation of innovative
alternatives to strict intellectual property regimes."); Jack M. Balkin, What Is Access to
Knowledge, BALKINIZATION (Apr. 21, 2006), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2006/04/what-is-
access-to-knowledge.html ("[No matter how restrictive IP laws may be, they may not be the
major cause of human suffering and lack of access to knowledge around the world.").
55. Amy Kapczynski et al., Addressing Global Health Inequities: An Open
Licensing Approach for Univemsity Innovations, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1031, 1032-33
(2005).
56. Arrow, supra note 27, at 616-17; see also BENKLER, supra note 28, at 37 ("On any
given day, enforcing copyright law leads to inefficient underutilization of copyrighted
information.").
57. Hand on Patent Reform, supra note 5, at 115.
1178 [Vol. 86:1163
MA TURIVG PA TENT THEORY
"[c]laims are frequently a far cry from what the inventor invented.""
"Patent law routinely gives control over products never built or
contemplated by the patent owners."' As a public relations matter, this
feature of modem patent law is particularly offensive to actual
inventors. A patentee can be given exclusive control over technology
he did not even invent. With the independent invention issue,
independent inventors are at least being taxed by another one who
actually invented the same thing. But by extending patent claims
beyond the actual invention, actual inventors are being forced to pay
tribute to patent holders who did not invent the technology in question
but yet managed to push broad patent claims through the system. This
problem is particularly apparent with the backlash against patent trolls.
In other, more doctrinal work, I argue that this feature of our current
system is inconsistent with the patent statute and even the
constitutional limits of the patent system." The point here is to
emphasize that this feature of modem patent law, which flows from the
incentive theory, also induces serious animosity.
Without provable benefits and with antagonized constituents, the
patent system cannot stabilize or mature. The patent controversy just
goes on. For example in their recent book, Agahist Intellectual
Monopoly, economists Michele Boldrin and David Levine conclude
that "'intellectual property[]' . . . does not increase either innovation or
creation. They are an unnecessary evil."' Their "basic conclusion ...
is that intellectual monopoly-patents, copyrights, and restrictive
licensing agreements-are unnecessary." Based on the current
narrative, their response cannot be fully refuted. By looking beyond
the rather coarse incentive story, we can begin to build an acceptable
patent narrative.
III. TRADITIONAL PROPERTY FUELING A REVOLUTION IN PATENT
THEORY
As noted in the Introduction, this Essay argues that traditional
private property might provide critically important guidance for today's
stagnant patent theory. That suggestion will surely strike many as
58. See Janice M. Mueller, In Memonam: A Rich Legacy, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
895, 899(1999).
59. BuRK & LEMLEY, supra note 44, at 67.
60. Oskar Liivak, Rescuing the Invention from the Cult of the Clam, 42 SETON HALL
L. REv. 1 (2012).
61. MICHELE BOLDRIN & DAVID K. LEVINE, AGAINST INTELLECTUAL MONOPOLY 7
(2008).
62. Id. at 15.
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inappropriate. There are significant normative, rhetorical, and
economic differences between tangible goods, the focus of the
traditional private property market, and intangible goods that are the
heart of patent law. As a result, making this express connection
between intellectual property and traditional property is seen as naive
and foolish. Admittedly there are real differences between these two
areas that make this comparison challenging, and they will be dealt
with below, but perhaps there is also a more significant perceived
barrier. For many, equating intellectual property with traditional
property appears anachronistic as it appears to shoehorn the complex
modern institution of IP into the absolute, stodgy, and nearly
medieval" institution of traditional property. And it is this last
perceived barrier that this Essay will address first.
A. Promoting Progress by Following History
In a significant way, our current understanding of traditional
property is more modem and advanced (and importantly accepted)
than our understanding of intellectual property. At one time traditional
property was rationalized in ways that looked awfully similar to today's
incentive-based patent theories. Those mercantile views dominated
property discourse until the mid-nineteenth century. Early on, as with
our current interest in technological development, the state was very
concerned with more general economic development. Traditional
property, the market, and economic development were steeped in
mercantilist views. It was thought that the state had to encourage
economic development directly. Early on, as related by Morton
Horwitz, this made some sense especially
[i]n an underdeveloped society, with little available private capital, a
policy of encouraging development required that the legal system
provide legal arrangements that guaranteed private investors certainty
and predictability of economic consequences. Perhaps the most
important of these guarantees was protection against freedom from
competitive injury. To accommodate this policy, courts promulgated
rules reflecting a view of property as essentially exclusive and
monopolistic, so that every attempt to draw business away from an
existing enterprise was usually treated as an injury to property itself."
63. See, ag, MORTON J. HORwIrz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERIcAN LAW 1780-
1860, at 115 (1977).
64. Id.at l11.
1180 [Vol. 86:1163
MA TURING PA TENT THEORY
Importantly, this description of encouraging development of traditional
markets would feel at home in patent theory. At one time both
traditional and intellectual property shared a common justification
along these mercantilist sentiments: risky development needed direct
state support.
Yet today, such notions are foreign for traditional property. Two
hundred years ago, traditional property underwent a revolution. Those
monopolistic grants, that had once been thought of as inherent
attributes of property, began to lose their luster. People appeared to be
willing to take on the risks of development themselves without
govermnent-created incentives, and the existing exclusive grants came
to be seen as net obstacles to economic growth as they prevented these
upstarts from entry. The mercantilist foundations were being swept
aside as classical economic thought came to the fore. Again, as related
by Horwitz:
But as [economic] development proceeded, the early monopolistic
strategy for encouraging economic growth soon became a legal barrier
to further growth .... Under the continuing pressure to encourage
further investment ... [a] monopolistic and exclusionary conception of
property was replaced by legal rules that allowed various
uncompensated injuries to property. Eventually, out of this sweeping
redefinition of property, the legal presumption in favor of competition
emerged full blown."
Property no longer protected property owners from competition. That
change, that great democratization of enterprise, which finally took
hold by the mid-nineteenth century, allowed for a great release of
"individual creative energy"66
As a historical matter when traditional property underwent this
revolution, patents were left behind. Even as he attacked mercantilism
generally, Adam Smith made allowances for keeping patents as
government grants because they were quite different from tangible
property. This raises an important question: Did patent law have to be
left behind? Was patent law left out of the classical economic
revolution because patents and technological advances are so
inherently different that they had to remain essentially an exceptional,
mercantilist institution or, if we are careful, could the benefits that
accrued from the great release of "individual creative energy" extend
to patents as well?
6 5. Id.
66. JAMES WILLARD HURST, LAW AND THE CONDITIONS OF FREEDOM IN THE
NINETEENTH-CENTURY UNITED STATES 6(1956).
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The purpose of this Essay is to argue that we should thoroughly
explore the latter option. We should try to bring the positive aspects of
the postmercantilist economic theory (and experience) to bear on
patent theory." There are significant reasons to think we are now
ready for exactly such a revolution in intellectual property (two
hundred years after it swept through traditional property). Returning
to the sentiment in the mid-1800s, we are increasingly viewing patent
law not as a great boon to technological development but rather as an
obstacle. Just as before, there is a great pent-up energy of creative
technological entrepreneurs anxiously hoping that the current patent
system would just get out of their way. Furthermore, we are becoming
increasingly aware of the immense informational burden a truly
incentive-based patent system imposes. For every industry we must
guess the right level of incentives and balance them against their
costs." Part of the classical economic revolution was to rid the state of
those informational burdens. In fact, "[T]he genius of a property
rights system is that it relies on such judicial discretion as little as
possible."" This does not mean that the state is not involved. The state
was and still is involved in defining and defending property rights and
in continuing oversight and regulation of the market through antitrust.
In short, could we solve the incentive problem in intellectual property
by no longer worrying about it? Could we, as was done for traditional
property, design a private property institution where private decision
making could produce efficient and robust technological development
without the need for the state to create artificial incentives?
B. P as Modem Pnvate Property: Pronuse and Obstacles
As mentioned above, many have reasons to doubt that intellectual
property could ever comfortably fit into the property rubric. First,
traditional property deals with scarce, rival resources where decisions
over allocation and use have to be made. Nonrival ideas that are at the
heart of patent law just do not seem to fit. In addition, the centerpiece
of the neoclassical model is competition with the end point of price
reaching marginal cost. With that end point, no one could ever recover
their fixed costs incurred in creating their inventions. In short, even
the central economic model appears inappropriate (and indeed as
shown below it is). Lastly, the rhetoric of traditional property all too
67. See, e.g, HOVENKAMP, supm note 7.
68. BURK & LEMLEY, supm note 44, at 37-66.
69. BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 27, at 222.
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easily leads to absolute control, and this seems alien to inherent
balancing found in most of patent law. All these obstacles ultimately
need to be addressed.
To enable a private property patent system that can adequately
address these concerns, this Essay begins by sketching private property
at a high level of generality. The Essay utilizes a modem analytical
framework for describing private property. That framework breaks the
analysis into two distinct steps: ownership and exclusion. Though
deeply related and often erroneously used interchangeably, recent work
has emphasized that ownership is a "special . .. object of analysis that
is independent of the right to exclude.""o
Ownership is the primary, more fundamental concept.
Ownership entails deciding who should own some scarce resource and
deciding to what productive end that owner can choose to use that
resource. Its "defining characteristic is that it is the special authority to
set the agenda for a resource."" In other words, society taps one
individual and delegates to him the responsibility to decide (from
among some spectrum of uses) how to best to use that scarce
resource.72
For modern private property markets, that ownership and agenda
setting discussion is deeply connected to the neoclassical model of
market exchange. From an economic perspective, the function of the
tangible private property markets is to allocate scarce resources
efficiently. As outlined in their textbook on economics, William
Baumol and Alan Blinder state "the fact that since no resource is
available in unlimited supply, people must consequently make
decisions consistent with their limited means."7 They identify this as
"the fundamental issue of economics."74
For a large number of our scarce resources, we have chosen to
use a private property market to allocate the use of those resources.
Sometimes owners hold onto and consume those resources on their
own, but often they choose to sell those resources (or products made
70. Larissa Katz, Exclusion and Exclusivity n Property Law, 58 U. TORONTO L.J.
275, 281 (2008).
71. Id. at 290.
72. See id.; see also Henry E. Smith, Intellectual Property as Property: Delineating
Entitlements in Information, 116 YALE L.J. 1742, 1777 n.l 14 (2007) ("Also reminiscent of the
modular benefits of property is EA. Hayek's argument that property, by establishing
boundaries over things over which decision-makers would be free to take action and prevent
interference by others, was the best and only workable method to achieve a coincidence of
expectations among members of society.").




from them) in the market. In that system, firms following a profit
motive make decisions on what inputs to buy and what outputs to
produce. To make those decisions, firms are assumed to have three
pieces of information before them. They have the prices for inputs.
They have a production function that embodies our current
technological know-how that maps all inputs into technologically
possible outputs. And they have demand curves for the outputs. With
these three pieces, firms should in theory be able to make profit-
seeking decisions about resource use."
Production functions map all available inputs into their outputs."
And given market prices for those inputs, a firm can use the
production function to calculate the cost of producing any of the
outputs found in their production function. Based on estimates of the
demand for each of these outputs, a firm can estimate the revenue it
would generate from producing each of those various outputs.
Subtracting the costs of production from the revenue gives the
predicted profit available for each possible output. Scanning the
profitability of each of these choices, firms choose the production plan
that maximizes profit.
The bulk of microeconomic analysis is devoted to proving that
this overall scheme, tempered by competition and entry by others, will
discipline private decision making such that the resulting production
decisions will be socially beneficial. That story forms the basis of
neoclassical economic microeconomics.
Once we delegate an owner for some resource, then we determine
the range of agendas that are possible for that resource. Neoclassical
economics along with modem lessons from antitrust guide the range
of agendas that can be left in the hands of private decision making.
Having that strong normative picture of the types of activities that are
socially beneficial and can be handled by private decision making,
private property can turn to the topic of exclusion. Exclusion is an
instrumental discussion that follows the discussion of ownership and
agendas. It asks what activities by nonowners would interfere with
those productive agendas of the owners. Through exclusion the
property system aims to prevent all the acts by nonowners that might
interfere with the productive agenda set by the owner. In this sense, as
emphasized by Jeremy Bentham, property provides security" so that
75. See id. at 34-50.
76. See id.
77. See JEREMY BENTHAM, THE THEORY OF LEGISLATION 109 (C.K. Ogden ed., 1950)
("We come now to the principal object of law,-the care of security. That inestimable good,
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we can confidently plan and invest in socially beneficial projects. It
allows people to focus on productive business models; with property,
people can focus on "planning, effort, and investment."78 Those
interfering actions become the core duties of forbearance prohibited by
the exclusive rights that accompany ownership. In a rough sense,
nonowners are prohibited from doing harm to the productive plans of
owners. Note that this private property vision of exclusion is not a
"legal incentive" vision. Exclusion in private property does not create
incentives, but it instead preserves existing economic incentives from
being lost due to third-party actions.
For tangible goods this analytical framework can support
relatively broad rights of exclusion. As to providing security over
tangible resources, society asks a simple question from a resource
owner:" what acts prevent you from disposing of the scarce resource
in the way you deem best? Assume you own an apple. In other words,
society has nominated you to choose the way in which the apple
should be used. Society wants you to decide whether it should be
eaten, should be made into a pie, or should be sold. You may be quite
reluctant to contemplate some far off but ultimately productive and
beneficial plan if you are worried about the myriad ways others might
derail or interfere with your plan. Property tries to prevent this type of
worrying and its associated acts of self-help. Property asks what
security, what assurances, do you need from the rest of us so that you
will stop worrying about such interferences and you will instead focus
on disposing of the apple efficiently? These are the acts that property
strives to prevent. As stated by Bentham, property generally does not
"reward;" rather, it "preserves" "recompense" by "arrestng the hand
the distinctive index of civilization, is entirely the work of law. Without law there is no
security and, consequently no abundance, and not even a certainty of subsistence and the only
equality which can exist in such a state of things is an equality of misery.").
78. Carol M. Rose, The Shadow of The Cathedral, 106 YALE L.J. 2175, 2188 (1997);
see also CAROL M. ROSE, PROPERTY AND PERSUASION: ESSAYS ON THE HISTORY, THEORY, AND
RHETORIC OF OWNERSHIP 3 (1994) ("[As] expressed by the eighteenth-century philosopher
Jeremy Bentham: property is designed to do something, and what it is supposed to do is to
tap individual energies in order to make us all more prosperous.").
79. For this Essay, we assume that society can efficiently choose an owner for
important resources. See Carol M. Rose, Possession as the Origin ofProperty, 52 U. CHI. L.
REv. 73 (1985). And for the case of patents, the critical resource is the inventor's own time
and human capital. As long as we are still in a system with a strong emphasis on liberty, then
the presumptive owner of someone's time is that person himself.
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[that] seek[s] to ravish ... #om you."" Property aims to prevent acts
by nonowners that will cause harm."
For a tangible resource like an apple, there are many, many ways
that others can impair your plans for the apple. Invariably, they all tend
to involve some physical contact with the apple. As a result, property
in apples precludes others from almost all physical contact. Because
the resource is relatively fragile, property must be relatively broad and
draconian-all the potential harmful acts must be prevented. As a
general rule, others are not allowed to touch your apple."
Importantly, as will be shown below, broad exclusion is not a
necessary feature of property-exclusion is just the instrumental
attempt to prevent harm to the agenda setting ability of owners. For
some resources, broad exclusion is necessary. For some other
resources and uses, broad exclusion is not needed.
IV. PATENTS AS MARKET PROPERTY: INVENTION MARKET
THEORY
This Part outlines an alternative patent narrative. Rather than
creating incentives through exclusion, this alternative narrative focuses
on making patents an extension of the traditional market economy.
Following the outline of private market property given above, this Part
first explores ownership of scarce resources in the context of patent
law. It then considers the range of agendas that can be socially
justified for those resources, and it then concludes with a discussion of
exclusion. This Part first describes the basic contours of such an
invention market theory and its major features. Its focal point is the
productive acts of creating and then distributing an invention to those
that can use it. The focus is not patents and their exclusion. The
normative heart of this patent theory is the creation and distribution of
technology to those that benefit from it. This narrative puts socially
beneficial productive acts directly at the focus rather than indirectly as
done by the current patent narrative. This Part shows how a system
built around that narrative fits as a natural extension of private
80. BENTHAM, supm note 77, at 110.
81. In copyright, a number of scholars are starting to focus on the exclusion needed
to prevent harm. See Christina Bohannan & Herbert Hovenkamp, IP and Antitrust.
Reformation and Harn, 51 B.C. L. REv 905 (2010); see also Christopher M. Newman,
Transformation in Property and Copynght (George Mason Univ. Law & Econ. Research
Paper Series, Working Paper No. 10-51, 2010), available at http://www.law.gmu.edu/pubs/
papers/10-51.
82. See Smith, suple note 72 (arguing for broad property rule for intellectual property
due to information costs).
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property and the tangible marketplace. This Part suggests the tools by
which we might prove that the projects that are privately profitable
under this system are also socially beneficial ones. In contrast to the
current theory, there is no inherent need to limit access to those who
can utilize the invention.
Under invention market theory, the function and purpose of the
patent system is, as the name implies, to undergird a market for
inventions. Inventions are solutions to technical problems; they
provide utility.
Economics has already created the metric by which to measure
the efficiency of this system. Paul Samuelson pointed out that the
socially beneficial public goods are those whose costs are outweighed
by the cumulative utility given to those who get access to the public
good. The Samuelson condition, as it is known, can be adapted for
inventions and can be used to gauge which inventions are worth the
opportunity-consuming cost inherent in consuming scarce resources to
create the inventions. As a society, we want inventors to pursue those
socially beneficial inventions. In other words, not only do we want to
create inventions, but we want to ensure that they get widely utilized.
Invention market theory provides a framework by which private
inventors and their allied investors will undertake only socially
beneficial inventions. In other words, invention market theory builds a
patent system where the private interests and decision making of
private inventors will hopefully coincide with society's interests.
A. Ownhng the Scarce Inputs to Invention
Invention market theory frames patents as private property.
Inventors own their time and other scarce resources that are needed
inputs for creating inventions. In regards to private property theory,
the purpose of invention market theory is to set conditions such that
inventors make socially beneficial decisions about allocating those
scarce resources toward creating and distributing inventions.
Invention market theory extends the traditional market to enable
inventors to sell their invention to those that can utilize their
inventions. As to private property, invention market theory frames
patents as mediating a market exchange. Inventors who have allocated
scarce resources toward inventing exchange the invention with a user
who can use the invention for money. Thus this private property vision
for patents sees them as just another example of allocation of
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"economically important resources ... on the basis of bilateral
exchange rather than central reallocation.'"'
The idea that patent law is a form of private property (premised
on the scarcity of the inputs to inventing) has been highlighted for
some time.84 But as used here, that observation allows patent law to
not only benefit from the history and experience of traditional
property, but it also allows patent law to fill an existing hole in private
property theory.
As was noticed decades ago (and as discussed above), in the basic
neoclassical model, firms are assumedto have all available technology
such that they can construct a production function." Yet, the model
does not explain where technology comes from. Technological growth
was thought of as exogenous to the model. Especially as it is now
accepted that technological growth is an important part of economic
growth generally, attempts have been made to make technological
growth an endogenous part of firm behavior.
Invention market theory aims to provide a natural extension of
this neoclassical model of a firm that incorporates endogenous
technological growth. In essence, invention market theory aims to
build a patent system that enables some to leave their jobs in the
existing tangible economy and to become professional inventors who
will supply inventions to firms. In short, patent system should focus
attention on the use of scarce inputs into creating technological know-
how that expands production possibilities.
B. Allocating Resources to Invention: The Samuelson Condition
The next question is deciding how much time and other inputs
should society devote to inventing? As a society, we need to develop
technology so that we can produce new products as well as produce
old products with more efficient processes. The critical question is
how much of our present scarce resources should we devote to
developing those new products and processes. Invention market
theory aims to make the decision by way of private decision making.
In essence, this Essay aims to show that, with a modest set of exclusive
rights, private individuals will become inventors (that is, people who
83. Waldron, supra note 13, at 343.
84. See Edmund W, Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. &
EcoN. 265 (1977); Smith, supra note 72, at 1745 n.4.
85. See Paul M. Romer, Endogenous Technological Change, 98 J. POL. EcoN. S71
(1990).
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spend their time creating and distributing inventions for profit) in cases
where that decision coincides with the best interests of society.
Importantly, such a system is not a legal incentive system. Such a
system is not aiming to create legal incentives artificially inducing
inventors to invent. Inventions are solutions to technical problems.
And new inventions enable firms to do things that they had not been
able to do before. Firms should be willing to pay for such solutions.
Invention market theory aims only to enable inventors to create and
sell their inventions to those that can use them. The patent laws that
undergird that system only aim to prevent third-party acts (like piracy)
that would otherwise threaten to derail an inventor's plan to satisfy that
demand for his invention.
Creating inventions of course requires effort, and the effort
expended creating an invention is effort not spent productively
elsewhere in the economy. This is exactly the cost that Arnold Plant
found so intractable in the current patent narrative. Society must
determine which inventions are worth these lost opportunities; not all
of them are worth it. To begin, persons of skill already have a rather
robust production function. Many solutions to technical problems are
already part of the public domain. Society need not expend valuable
resources developing those already existing solutions. For this reason,
this patent narrative has, as does the current patent system, a novelty
requirement."
But even among new inventions, not all of them will produce
benefits that outweigh their costs. It is here that the public goods
nature of inventions becomes most relevant and economic
developments dealing with public goods can help to determine which
inventions are socially worth undertaking. In a series of articles
beginning in 1954, Samuelson developed what is now known as the
Samuelson condition." It describes the Pareto-optimal condition for
the provision of public goods and it determines which inventions are
socially beneficial. Samuelson showed that public goods should be
supplied as long as
86. See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2006).
87. Paul A. Samuelson, Diagmmmatic Exposition ofa Theory ofPublic Expenditure,
37 REv. EcON. & STAT. 350, 356 (1955); Paul A. Samuelson, The Pure Theory of Public
Expendilre, 36 REv. EcoN. & STAT. 387 (1954).
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=t 1MRSy ;> MRTy."
Here, MRSly is the marginal rate of substitution between the public
good y and some private good z for the ith person in an economy.
MRTy is the marginal rate of transformation between the public good
y and the private good z Though developed nearly sixty years ago,
this condition has only recently been brought to the discussion of
intellectual property in the legal scholarship."
Though daunting in appearance, its content can be interpreted
relatively easily. The right hand side of the equation represents the
slope of the production possibilities frontier between private good z
and public good y It represents what private good has to be given up
in order to create public good y. In other words, the right hand side of
this condition is the opportunity cost of creating some invention. The
right hand side represents the alternative outputs we could have
produced in lieu of the invention. This cost is exactly the cost that
worried Arnold Plant.
The left hand side of the equation is also understood relatively
easily. It is the sum of marginal rates of substitution for the public
good. It is the sum, over all individuals, of their preference for the
public good y over the private good z In other words, thinking of the,
public good y as an invention, MRS'y represents how much of some
private good z the ith person would give up for instead having the
invention.
Importantly, the invention can be used by all firms
simultaneously and each of them value the invention based on its
utility to them. The Samuelson condition tells us which inventions are
socially worthwhile to pursue. Inventions in which opportunity costs
are outweighed by the collective utility they bring to firms are worth
pursuing.
Using the Samuelson condition as the top-level guide for a patent
system provides an important result. First, the patent system no longer
needs to be seen as necessarily preventing access. Patents no longer
need to be viewed as a necessary but tragic and unsavory compromise.
Instead, anyone who can benefit from the invention can do so as long
88. See RICHARD CORNEs & TODD SANDLER, THE THEORY OF EXTERNALEIHES, PUBLIC
GOODS, AND CLUB GOODS 23 (1986).
89. See John P. Conley & Christopher S. Yoo, Nondvary andPice Discnminaion in
CopynghtEconomics, 157 U. PA. L. REv 1801, 1802 (2009); Lunney, supra note 37, at 450-
55; Christopher S. Yoo, Copynght and Public Good Economics: A Msunderstood Relation,
155 U. PA. L. REV. 635, 662 (2007).
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as they contribute (some subset of their benefits) to offsetting the costs
of developing the invention. As explored below, building a private
property system that can produce and distribute inventions that satisfy
the Samuelson condition is surely challenging, but, in light of the
public relations benefits available from employing this top-level
condition, surely we should fully explore its potential. For invention
market theory, the Samuelson condition then defines the range of
socially beneficial agendas for an inventor's time. Society should be
able to support inventors who undertake the creation and distribution
of inventions where those inventions satisfy the Samuelson condition.
C Obstacle: Private Decision Making and Markets for Inventions?
The above analysis only highlights which inventions are socially
worthwhile undertaking. However, it does not directly address
whether some private property system could enable the private
provision of those socially beneficial inventions. As has been
understood for some time, if enjoyment of the public good were made
excludable by law, then private production of public goods could
become viable. In other words, if a firm that wanted to utilize some
invention had to negotiate with the inventor to get access, rather than
by copying (pirating) the invention, then private decision making could
coincide with the Samuelson condition. With a minimal set of
exclusive rights, an inventor would go forward with producing the
invention when the opportunity cost of making that invention was
outweighed by the amount each individual was willing to pay for the
use of the invention. In other words, people would become
professional inventors when their time and resources were better spent
creating and distributing inventions than in some traditional business.
But even in Samuelson's earliest writings on this, he immediately
worried that such private production of public goods would be fatally
defective. He worried that people would strategically understate their
valuation of public goods, and as a result this private production
scheme would underproduce public goods. To this day, this is thought
to be a fundamental obstacle for the private provision of most public
goods." Though it is beyond the scope of this Essay, this stumbling
block, namely the presumed unwillingness for consumers to reveal
their valuation, needs to be the focus of patent theory. There are
90. See Conley & Yoo, supra note 89, at 1803 ("Although economists have proposed
a wide range of potential solutions to this problem, they have largely failed to produce a




reasons to believe that such a patent theory could overcome that
obstacle and could succeed in providing private decision making that
satisfies the Samuelson condition. If patent theory focused just on
inventions (as directed by the statute) rather than on information more
generally, patent theory has a chance of overcoming this serious
obstacle because the invention is a special and particular package of
information that allows valuation that is near impossible for
information more generally.
D Promise: DefiningHatmandDefinngExclusion
Having sketched the purpose and basic structure of an invention
market based patent system, this Essay has yet to address the type of
exclusion that is needed to protect and enable that system. A full
consideration of that topic is beyond the scope of this Essay, and it
depends a great deal on first answering some of the hard questions
posed above in Subpart C, but nonetheless there are good reasons to
think that a patent system designed to produce a market in inventions
will not need the same absolute exclusion that is often seen for tangible
property.
When the reasoning from Part I.B is imported into the
intangible realm, we note an important difference. As opposed to
tangibles, an owner's plans for intangibles are rather hard to harm.
Society has put you in charge of your own time and assorted other
resources (like laboratory space, word processors, etc.) that are needed
to create intangibles. If you intend to invest your time and resources to
create some intangible and you do not intend to sell that intangible,
then there is very little anyone can do to disrupt that plan. Others can
take, share, or even try to sell copies of your intangible, but you still
have your original intangible and you can enjoy it all you want." Your
plans have not been (in fact cannot be) derailed by others. Private
property's exclusionary grant is just not needed here. This is a very
important difference between property in tangibles and property in
intangibles. For tangible things, private property is needed if you
intend to consume the resource yourself or if you intend to exchange
the resource in the market. For things like ideas or inventions, there is
no need for any exclusion to protect your own use of your invention.
For things like inventions, the actions of others become relevant
only when you invest time and resources to create an intangible and
91. SeeTHE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, 11 MARCH To 27 NOVEMBER 1813, supm
note 12, at 383.
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you intend to sell it in hopes of recouping your costs. There the
actions of others can have a real impact. Others can act in ways that
can derail your plan to recoup your costs. It is these derailing acts, and
not much else, that should be the focus of patent law's exclusionary
reach. Property in tangible goods has to have rather broad exclusion
because there are so many different ways others can harm a tangible.
For intangibles, there are only very specific acts that need to be
addressed. In short, patent rights need not be very broad because there
are not that many ways to "hurt" an idea. First, consider outright
piracy; outright copying and selling of my invention that I intended to
sell myself surely impacts my ability to recoup my expenses. If I want
to be an inventor, piracy then interferes with my agenda for my time.
The act of piracy in patent law is the copying and then selling of the
invention of another.92 When this occurs, the original inventor cannot
recoup his large upfront costs. Pirates do not have similar substantial
fixed costs to recoup and thus they can undercut the initial inventor.
This prevents the initial inventor from recouping his investment of
time and resources. In short, piracy prevents inventive business
models from being feasible in the same way that theft prevents the
feasible production of tangible goods. Piracy is copying that
forecloses any hope of recovering the initial investment. In economic
terms, unfettered piracy drives price to marginal cost. It is a parasitic
act that kills its host. Such acts are described in misappropriation as
acts that might kill the "goose that lays the golden eggs."93 Without
reasonable hope for any profit and in fact with almost certain losses,
piracy deadens inventive business models. In order to provide
adequate security, patent law needs to prevent piracy.
And if the normative focus is on selling the invention created by
an inventor, then it is not entirely clear that the scope of exclusion
should ever extend beyond the actual invention conceived by the
92. Consider also the effect of consumers who copy the invention but who do not
intend on selling it to others. Individually they cause less harm than pirates, but collectively
they could cause the same harm. Although there may be room for more nuanced arguments,
for the purposes of this Essay, such consumer copying and using also needs to be prevented.
See Sara K. Stadler, Copyight as Trade Regulation, 155 U. PA. L. Rrv. 899 (2007); see also
Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Foresecabihty and Copynght Incentives, 122 HARV. L. REv. 1571
(2009).
93. Richard A. Posner, Misappropriation: A Dige, 40 Hous. L. REv. 621, 639 (2003)
(describing the best test for misappropriation as one developed by Judge Winter, which
"requires the court to determine, in any case that passes through his first four filters, whether
the ability of other parties to free ride on the efforts of the plaintiff would so reduce the
incentive to produce the product or service that its existence or quality would be substantially
threatened" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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inventor. One of the most conspicuous features of the current patent
system is the breadth of modem patent claims. They are "frequently a
far cry from what the inventor invented."94 In other words, "Patent law
routinely gives control over products never built or contemplated by
the patent owners."" In recent doctrinal work, I have argued such
broad claims have been allowed by a misinterpretation of the patent
statutes and when properly interpreted, patent claims cannot exceed the
inventor's actual invention. Though I think that doctrinal argument can
stand on its own, a higher level, policy driven justification of such a
limit would be helpful. Invention market theory provides that limit.
Broad exclusion beyond the actual invention is just not justified by
invention market theory. If the aim of the patent system is to enable
inventors to sell their inventions, then there is no need to give
exclusion over technological solutions that were not conceived by that
inventor.
In an important sense, this instrumental view of exclusion in
patent law places focus on the acts that would harm the ability of the
system from effectuating the efficient purpose highlighted by the
Samuelson condition. As described above, the focus of exclusion
would be on preventing the acts that inhibit owners of the scarce inputs
from using those resources toward the socially beneficial agendas of
creating and distributing useful technology. In their recent book,
Herbert Hovenkamp and Christina Bohannan have put a great deal of
emphasis on searching for a principle of harm as the guide to the
proper scope of patent exclusion." Guided only by the coarse
incentive and access narrative, it is quite hard to articulate a theory of
harm that can help define the proper bounds of the patent system. This
Essay argues that the proper allocation of scarce resources toward
inventions and the subsequent distribution of those inventions to those
that can use them can provide the normative basis by which to start a
more constructive discussion about harm and the exclusion needed to
prevent it.
V. CONCLUSION
We need technological progress and we need a stable, effective
patent system to promote it. Currently we do not have one. For too
long, we have been constrained by our legal incentive vision for the
94. See Mueller, supra note 58, at 899.
95. BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 44, at 67.
96. See CHRISTINA BOHANNAN & HERBET HOVENKAMP, CREATION WITHOUT
RESTRAINT: PROMOTING LIBERTY AND RIVALRY IN INNOVATION 33-59 (2012).
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patent system. It is inherently indeterminate and it leads to discord.
As argued above, we should not and need not be worrying about
creating incentives. We should stop focusing on creating incentives
through exclusion and instead focus on creating and distributing useful
technology. A simpler patent system that focuses only on allowing
inventors to create and distribute their inventions to those that can use
them can be justified and does not create inherent dissent.
&
